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Hegel's Phenomenology:
Reverberations in His Later System
Howard P. Kainz
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
Hegel indicates toward the end of his Phenomenology of Spirit that
there would be a parallelism in the categories of his later system to the
various configurations of consciousness in the Phenomenology. Some general
correspondences have been indicated by Otto Pöggeler and suggested by
Robert Grant McRae, but I argue in this paper that there are at least four
important and more specific parallels, bringing out simultaneously a similarity
of content and a difference of approach and methodology in the two works: 1)
in the philosophical construal of “categories”; 2) in the conceptualization of a
“phenomenology”; 3) in the analysis of the dialectical relationship of religion
and art; and 4) in the relationship of the history of philosophy to the
Absolute.

As is well-known, Hegel initially visualized his Jena
Phenomenology of Spirit as an introduction to his projected system. He
even remarks, toward the end of the Phenomenology, that there will
be a correspondence between the various Gestalten in the
Phenomenology and the Categories that will be generated in his later
system of philosophy:
In general, to each of the abstract Moments of [philosophical]
Science there corresponds a configuration of appearing
[phenomenological] Spirit. Just as Spirit in its existence is not
richer than Science, so also Spirit in its content is not poorer
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than Science. When the pure concepts [categories] of Science
are known in their present form (as configurations of
consciousness), this brings out the aspect of their reality; after
this, their essence, the Concept, which is established in them as
thought in simple mediation, breaks the Moments of this
mediation apart and is exhibited [in philosophical Science]
according to its inner opposition.1
This definitely seems to imply that in the course of the
exploration of consciousness and Spirit in the Phenomenology, certain
important configurations will be encountered that Hegel will return to
as Categories in his Wissenschaft der Logik, and other systematic
endeavors, in order to develop scientifically their essential oppositions.
But it is a matter of dispute as to whether he actually carried out this
intention, and, if so, what "correspondences" should be particularly
noted.
Otto Poggeler maintains that the best way of interpreting this
statement from the final parts of the Phenomenology is in terms of a
projection that Hegel made before publishing the 1807
Phenomenology.2 In his Realphilosophie of 1805-1806, Hegel had
projected his future system as consisting of six parts: Being, Relation,
Life and Cognition, Knowing Knowledge, Spirit, and the SelfKnowledge of Spirit. Thus, Poggeler suggests, there are some general
correspondences in the Phenomenology with this initial projection: The
phenomenology of Sense-certainty with the category of Being; the
dialectics of Perception and Understanding with the category of
Relation; the "Truth of Self-Certainty" with the category of Life;
Reason with the category of Knowledge; the phenomenology of Spirit
with the Category of Spirit; and the sections on Religion and Absolute
Knowledge with the projected Category of the "Self-knowledge of
Spirit." But Poggeler finds no other specific and significant
correspondences ofelements of the Phenomenology with the later
system.
Before proceeding any further on this question, we should take
into account the fact that Hegel's later system included not only his
Wissenschaft der Logik and his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen
Wissenschaften, but also numerous works and lectures which branched
out from the system, expanding and clarifying elements of the system.
For instance, Hegel's publication of the Grundlinien der Philosophie des
Rechts was a more detailed development of topics outlined in the
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section on Objective Spirit in his Encyclopedia. His lectures on the
Philosophy of History expanded on the general remarks in the subsection on Universal History in Objective Spirit in the Encyclopedia
(§§548-549) and on the more detailed remarks on universal history in
the Philosophy of Right (§§341-360). Likewise, Hegel's lectures on
aesthetics expand on the basic divisions of symbolic, classical and
romantic art discussed in the Encyclopedia in the Philosophy of Art;
parts of Hegel's lectures on Religion expanded on the sub-section on
Revealed Religion in the section on Absolute Spirit in the Encyclopedia
(§§564-571); and Hegel's lectures on the History of Philosophy are, of
course, a further development of the sub-section on Philosophy which
brings the final triad of Absolute Spirit (after Art and Religion) to
completion in the Encyclopedia (§§572-577).
If we take into account all these wider developments of Hegel's
system, do we find any significant correspondences which may help us
to gain a greater insight into Hegel's possible fidelity to his original
plan? Robert Grant McRae maintains that there are some obvious
dialectical processes that carry over from the Phenomenology to the
System.3 For example, the movements of Force and Concept in the
chapter on Understanding in the Phenomenology have their
counterpart in Subjective Logic in Hegel's Science of Logic, the chapter
on Reason has reverberations in the final section of Subjective Logic
on the Idea, the discussion of the emergence of the family and the
state in Chapter VI on Spirit in the Phenomenology is reflected in the
philosophy of Objective Spirit in the Encyclopedia, and the final
chapter on “Absolute Knowledge” in the Phenomenology obviously
corresponds to the final segment of the Encyclopedia on “Absolute
Spirit.”
But these are still very general correspondences. Are there any
more specific areas where the Phenomenology of Spirit actually lays
the groundwork for developments in Hegel’s later system, and thus
can contribute to the elucidation of parts of that system? I suggest
that there are four such areas:
1. One of the first places to look for a specific and important
correspondence between the Phenomenology and the System would
be in chapter 5, "Reason," where Hegel differentiates the "Category"
which characterizes true, authentic philosophical idealism from, on the
one hand, the ten object-oriented "substantial" Aristotelian categories
and, on the other hand, the twelve subjectively-conditioning "thinking
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realities," i.e., the Kantian categories (and Fichte's Kantian revisionism
in terms of the ego's self-identity). Hegel compares these two types of
categories with his own construal, as follows:
The Category, which formerly had the connotation of being the
substantiality of what exists—either (indefinitely) the
substantiality of existence-in-general, or the substantiality of
existence over against consciousness—is now the substantiality,
i.e. the simple unity, ofthe existent only insofar as it is a
thinking-reality .... Only a one-sided, defective Idealism lets this
unity come to the fore again as consciousness, on one side, and,
over against consciousness, an in-itself. But the present
Category, that is, the simple unity of Self-Consciousness and
existence, has difference within itself. For its essence is just
this: to be immediately identical-with-self in otherness, in
absolute difference.4
The standpoint of the Category is finally attained only at the end
of the Phenomenology. At this point, the series of oscillations and
ironical developments that took place in the "Science of the Experience
of Consciousness" are superseded by a new perspective in which the
oppositions of self-consciousness and existence, and all other related
oppositions, are viewed serenely in the overall interrelationship
between Spirit's Consciousness, coming to its culmination in chapter 6,
and Spirit's Self-Consciousness emerging in chapter 7, thus making
possible true philosophical Science. The stage is set for further
"categorial" development, in which unity is coordinated with
difference: For example, in Hegel's subsequent Encyclopedia of the
Philosophical Sciences, starting with the Logic, "Being" is portrayed in
its intimate relationship with nothingness, quality with quantity,
essence with existence, form with matter; in the Philosophy of Nature,
space and time are portrayed in their interrelationships, and polarities
are highlighted (for example, in chemistry, electricity, and
magnetism); and finally in the Philosophy of Spirit, we examine the
unity-in-difference of consciousness and the unconscious, freedom and
determinism, rights and laws, family and state, and the ultimate
unification of Self-consciousness and Being in art, religion, and
philosophy.
2. Another, and more obvious, locus where the Phenomenology
impacts on the later System, is in the first section of the third part of
the Encyclopedia, where Hegel treats of the “Phenomenology of Spirit.”
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The topics discussed in this section are topics also discussed in
chapters 1-4, and the beginning of chapter 5, of the Phenomenology.
But this section of the Encyclopedia is by no means just a summary of
the early chapters of the Phenomenology, nor is it a revised and
improved version, overcoming the deficiencies of the earlier work, as
Michael Petry, translator of the “Berlin Phenomenology,” has
suggested. Rather, it takes up the phenomenological topics from a new
vantage point—the perspective of the Category. Thus we find no
"phenomenological" series of ironical development—Sense-Certainty
initially deceived about the particularity of the "Here" and "Now," but
then forced to construe them as universal; Sense-Certainty moving
from realism to idealism; Perception initially believing the properties of
the Thing were essential, but then realizing that the ego is constantly
uniting and differentiating aspects of the perceptual object;
Consciousness examining the laws of objects and forced into
examination of itself formulating the laws; Master and Slave
consciousnesses ending up in a reversal of roles; Self-Consciousness
reaching a point at which it needs to unite with Consciousness in the
new configuration of Reason; and so forth. Rather, in the section on
"Phenomenology" in the Encyclopedia, Hegel treats of the same topics
"scientifically," from the standpoint of the Category of the unity of
subject and object. Rather than letting consciousness meander
through various "determinate negations" in trying to raise its
certainties to truth, Hegel now stands as a third party observer,
making explicit the dialectical relationships that exist in subjective
spirit. He describes how the relationship to space and time involves a
coordination of particular and universal "Heres" and "Nows," how the
viewpoint of Perception coordinates Consciousness and sensory
properties, how Understanding as it focuses more deeply on laws ends
up at Self-Consciousness, how Master and Slave as types of
consciousness result from the desire of Self-Consciousness to find
equilibrium with its special kind of object, and how Reason finally
brings about the Categorical synthesis of Consciousness and SelfConsciousness. The treatments of these subjects in the Jena
Phenomenology and the later systematic section on "Phenomenology"
are different but complementary. Sometimes opacities that may exist
in the earlier work can even be cleared up by areading of the later
work, and vice versa. But by no means is the later work merely. a
summary or abridgement of the earlier.
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3. The chapter on Religion in the Jena Phenomenology analyzes
the evolution from nature-religions like Zoroastrianism to "art religion"
(exemplified primarily in ancient Greek statuary, architecture,
hymnody, poetry and drama) to "revealed religion" (i.e., the
phenomenological emergence of Christianity out of Hebrew religion).
In the Encyclopedia, unlike the Phenomenology, Art and Religion are
treated as separate moments in the development of Absolute Spirit—
art being an immediate sensuous synthesis of being and thought,
religion being a synthesis mediated by the imagination. But there are
many similar topics; and here again, the later treatment differs from
the earlier by being "scientific" and categorial. Thus, the movement
which takes place from the "happy consciousness" of Greek comedy to
the ''unhappy consciousness" of Judaism in the Phenomenology is
restructured in the Encyclopedia as an analysis (§§556-563) of the
embodiment of the absolute in classical art, as compared with the
embodiment of the absolute in the doctrine of the Incarnation; and the
earlier phenomenological development from internal Trinitarian
relationships of the deity to creation, and then to the knowledge of
good and evil, to the fall, and to the subsequent atonement by the
God-man, is analyzed in the later system (§§564-571) as an unfolding
of the concept of the Trinity. In other words, the dialectic from
creation to atonement in the Phenomenology of Spirit gives way in the
Encyclopedia to the "timeless" consideration of the moments of the
Concept of the Absolute in Religion.
4. As mentioned above, Hegel's lectures on the philosophies of
aesthetics, religion, and history are mostly expansions in greater detail
of concepts developed in the Philosophy of Spirit in the Encyclopedia.
But his lectures on the history of philosophy not only expand the final
section in the Encyclopedia, showing how philosophy synthesizes the
absolutes arrived at in art and religion, but also are even more directly
connected with the Phenomenology. In a brief sketch covering a few
pages in the chapter on “Absolute Knowledge” in the Phenomenology,5
Hegel describes how the attainment of the “absolute” standpoint of the
identity-in-distinction of Being and thought had been attained in the
history of modern philosophy. No names are mentioned, but it is clear
to which philosophers Hegel is referring in his succinct overview of the
previous two centuries: With Francis Bacon, modern philosophy began
emphasizing observation, to discover the rationality within nature;
then Descartes discovered Being in thought; Spinoza emphasized the
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immediate unity of thinking and existence; Leibniz reacted against the
selfless characteristics of the Spinozan synthesis, and "asserted the
claims of individuality"; Voltaire and Diderot and other philosophes
"externalized individualization in culture"; Helvetius and other
utilitarians "arose to the thought of utility"; then philosophy began to
"grasp existence as its own will" with Rousseau's volonté general and
Kant's apolitical and idealist reconstruction of Rousseau's "general will"
in his categorical imperative; finally, a subjective construal of the
relation of self to otherness was attained by Fichte' s ego=ego, and
Schelling produced an objective, substantial construal of the same
relation, which unfortunately ended up as an abyss of absolute
identity, into which everything could be arbitrarily tossed. Hegel then
mentions the solution he himself has come up with, to mediate
between the Fichtean and Schellingean extremes: a type of knowledge
which "consists rather in this apparent inactivity [of Spirit] that merely
considers how what is differentiated moves itself in itself and devolves
once again into its unity."6
Hegel's later lectures on the history of modern philosophy follow
almost the same series of philosophical positions, with a few additions,
and leading up to the then-present state of German idealism in which
the one-sidedness of both Fichte and Schelling have finally given away
to Absolute Knowledge as the privileged unity-in-distinction of thought
and Being which can provide a trustworthy foundation for a truly
"scientific" philosophical system.
It is arguable that these lectures on the history of philosophy
fulfill Hegel's earliest systematic intentions, encompassing what Hegel
had in mind when in the Preface to the Phenomenology he writes,
The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific
system of truth. The goal which I have set before myself is to
collaborate to bring it about that philosophy approximates the
form of Science, that philosophy can put aside its name, "the
love of knowledge," in order to be real knowledge. The inner
necessity for knowledge to be Science lies in its very nature,
and the satisfactory clarification on this issue is simply the
exposition of philosophy itself. But the external necessity,
insofar as it can be comprehended in a universal fashion, aside
from the accidents of person and individual occasions, is exactly
the same as the inner necessity-[but] in the form of the way
that time presents the existence of its moments. To
demonstrate that the elevation of philosophy to Science is
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immanent in our time would be the only valid justification of the
attempts that are directed towards the goal of philosophical
Science, because "the times" would bring about the necessity
for this to happen, or rather actually accomplish the goal.7
(emphasis added to the last sentence)
Hegel here refers to an "external necessity" that can be comprehended
in a temporal fashion, and there can be no doubt that Hegel, a
consummate student of the history of philosophy, saw this history as
leading up inevitably to his own approach to the systematization of
philosophy. Otto Pöggeler may have had this in mind when he speaks
about an "external" introduction to Hegel's system of philosophy:
In the Encyclopedia, §§13-14, Hegel says that the history of
philosophy is, in the element of externality, just what the
philosophical system is, in the element of thought. What
previously was a prerogative of the Phenomenology is now a
function of historical reflection. This historical approach
demonstrates, for example, that the time is ripe for the content
of religion to be raised to the conceptual level, and for the thencontemporary philosophy to be involved in presenting the truth
as "objective thought." (Encyclopedia, §§24ff.)8
The Phenomenology of Spirit was, of course, meant to be the
Introduction, as well as the First Part, of Hegel's system of philosophy.
Whether or not the history of philosophy, as an external introduction
to his system, is an improved introduction over the Phenomenology
itself, it seems Hegel may have had this alternative introduction in
mind when, after finishing the Phenomenology, he sat down to write
those words in the Preface.

Notes
1. G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hans-Friedrich Wessels
and Heinrich Clainnont (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988), p. 529:
Entspricht jedem abstrakten Momente der Wissenschaft eine Gestalt
des erscheinenden Geistd überhaupt. Wie der daseiende Geist nicht
reicher ist als sie, so ist er in seinem Inhalte auch nicht ärmer. Die
reinen Begriffe der Wissenschaft in dieser Form von Gestalten des
Bewuβtseins zu erkennen, macht die Seite ihrer Realität aus, nach
welcher ihr Wesen, der Begriff, der in ihr in seiner einfachen
Vermittlung als Denken gesetzt ist, die Momente dieser Vermittlung
auseinanderschlägt und nach dem inneren Gegensatze sich darstellt.
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2. Otto Pöggeler, Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes
(Freiburg/München: Karl Alber Verlag, 1973), pp. 222, 226.
3. Robert Grant McRae, Philosophy and the Absolute (The Hague: Nijhoff,
1985), pp. 31-32, 41.
4. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 160: “Die Kategorie, welche sonst die
Bedeutung hatte, Wesenheit des Seyenden zu seyn, unbestimmt des
Seyenden überhaupt oder des Seyenden gegen das Bewuβtseyn, ist
itzt Wesenheit oder einfache Einheit des Seyenden nur als denkende
Wirklichkeit; ... Nur der einseitige schlechte Idealismus läβt diese
Einheit wieder als Bewuβtseyn auf die eine Seite, und ihr gegenüber
ein Ansich treten.—Diese Kategorie nun oder einfache Einheit des
Selbstbewuβtseyns und des Seyns hat aber an sich den Unterschied;
denn ihr Wesen ist eben dieses, im Andersseyn oder im absoluten
Unterschiede unmittelbar sich selbst gleich zu seyn.” In the next
paragraph, Hegel criticizes the notion that there is a specific number of
categories, and finds it disgraceful that Kant thought we could “scare
up the multiplicity of categories in any old manner—for example, out
of the types of judgement—as a 'find,' and to let oneself be satisfied
with this state of affairs.
5. Phänomenologie des Geistes, pp. 526--527; §§803-804 in the Miller
translation (Oxford University Press, 1977). For a line-by-line analysis
of this section, see my Hegel's Phenomenology: Selections
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 164-169.
6. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 527: Das Wissen besteht vielmehr in
dieser scheinbaren Unthätigkeit, welche nur betrachtet, wie das
Unterschiedene sich an ihm selbst bewegt, und in seine Einheit
zurückkehrt.
7. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 6: Die wahre Gestalt, in welcher die
Wahrheit existiertm, kann allein das wissenschaftliche System
derselben sein. Daran mitzuarbeiten, daβ die Philosophie der Form der
Wissenschaft näher komme,—dem Ziele, ihren Namen der Liebe zum
Wissen ablegen zu können und wirkliches Wissen zu sein,—ist es, was
ich mir vorgesetzt. Die innere Notwendigkeit, daβ das Wissen
Wissenschaft sei, leigt in seiner Natur, und die befriedigende Erklärung
hierüber ist allein die Darstellung der Philosophie selbst. Die äuβere
Notwendigkeit aber, in so fern sie, abgesehen von der Zufälligkeit der
Person und der individuen Veranlassungen, auf eine allgemeiene Weise
gefaβt wird, ist dasselbe, was die innere, in der Gestalt, wie die Zeit
das Dasein ihrer Momente vorstellt. Daβ die Erhebung der Philosophie
zur Wissenschaft an der Zeit ist, dies aufzuzeigen würde daher die
einzig wahre Rechtfergigung der Versuche sein, die diesen Zweck
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haben, weil sie die Notwendigkeit desselben dartun, ja weil sie ihn
zugleich ausführen würde.
8. Otto Pöggeler, Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 226: In
der Enzyklopädie (§§13 und 14) sagt Hegel, die Geschichte der
Philosophie sei das im Element der Äuβerlichkeit, was das System im
Element des Denkens sei. Was Früher der Phän. vorbehalten war, wird
jetzt von der geschichtlichen Besinnung geleistet: diese stellt nun den
Weg zur Wissenschaft dar. Sie zeigt z.B., daβ es an der Zeit ist, die
Gehalte der Religion in den Begriff zu erheben, daβ die neuzeitliche
Philosophie darauf hinausläuft, die Wahrheit als den 'objektiven
Gedanken' zu erweisen (Enzyklopädie §§24ff.).
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